

For activists and academics—and everyone in between

Who said this?

“Today we think of what is referred to as ‘Truth’ and ‘Justice’, of the ‘Humanity’ advocated in conferences and of what our infant minds having grown pre-maturely refer to as ‘Tragedy’.” (c.f. "du'afa" in her novel *Hathayan hirr musab bil-ikti'ab* [The Hallucination of a Cat Afflicted with a Depression], 2005).



Nadia Al-Ghazzi

Opportunities

Call for Papers

The editorial committee of *Al-Raida* invites submissions to a non-thematic, double-blind, peer reviewed issue.

For more information kindly contact al-raida: al-raida@lau.edu.lb

Call for Chapters

(Edited Volume)

Arab Spring and Peripheries

An edited volume about the role and the reactions of “peripheries” to the so-called Arab Spring.

Abstract Submission Deadline:

November 1, 2013

Click [here](#) for more information.

Call for Papers for a Workshop on:

Alimahs, Muhaddithahs, and Mujtahidahs: The Past and Present of Female Religious Authority in Shi'i Islam

To be held at Princeton University, **March 6-8, 2014**

Conveners: Mirjam Künkler

(Princeton University, USA) and Keiko Sakurai (Waseda University, Japan)

Abstract Submission Deadline:

November 1, 2013.

Click [here](#) for more information.



Arab Women's Entrepreneurship Program Helps Underserved Arab Women Realize Their Economic Potential

Page 5

Women and the Crucible of the Syrian Revolution

Sherifa Zuhur*

Women are involved in every possible aspect of the Syrian revolution (the terms “conflict,” “uprising,” or “civil war,” are incomplete or inaccurate descriptors¹) which began March 15, 2011. From President Assad’s advisor, Bouthaina Shaaban, to women in the Syrian revolution, refugees forced from their homes, or socialites of Damascus, no-one, male or female, aged or infant is spared from the threat of violence. Although many women journalists write on Syria, media coverage usually portrays women as absent from the street, the military struggle and the political opposition to Assad. This falsely implies women’s non-agency, or that violence and revolution devastate them, and does not illustrate their role in a revolution “of” (or in Marxist terms, *für*) them.

The revolution carries multiple frames of ambivalence. Women have coordinated to carry out specific actions in support of the revolution, but the effort to end Bashar al-Assad’s regime has by no means united all Syrian women. Revolution-supporters are engaged in media war alongside other forms of struggle against regime forces and their supporters, and international detractors of the revolution. The international media portrays Syrians as being somewhat like Egyptian citizens who united against Mubarak in 2011 although possessing differing aims, ideals and loyalties, because distinct, but often hostile groups of Syrians agree on the need to oust the Assad regime, but not on much else. These divisions are acknowledged yet challenged by certain revolutionary women’s understanding that they are contesting Islamist, patriarchal,

patrimonial and factional frameworks or as they put it, the necessity of multiple revolutions.

According to the narrative preferred in the international media, the Assads and the Ba`th Party promoted equality for women, at least relatively speaking. Bashar al-Assad agreed to terminate Article 548 of the penal code which had exempted those who committed crimes of honor. In contrast with Sha`lan nightclub revelers in Damascus who dance to the song “You and I salute General Maher,” to forget the fighting ([Agence France Press, 2013](#)), Islamist male fighters in the Syrian revolution have grown up with women who wear modest covering, and they hope to restrict many of women’s freedoms. Still, the Assad-supporters’ or anti-Islamists’ assertion that the regime is

Women and the Crucible of the Syrian Revolution

better for women and minorities than the Islamist revolutionaries is rendered meaningless in the face of the regime's astounding brutality. That claim is also challenged by the numbers of minorities and women involved in the revolution who often enact strongly postcolonial and postmodern positions and insights, as Sondra Hale discussed in last month's issue ([Hale, 2013](#)).

Syria's opposition is more disparate in social terms than are regime supporters. Some of Syria's nonviolent activists first became active in the Damascus Spring of 2001, quashed by Bashar al-Assad. Mohja Kahf points out these are mainly secularists, and were highly ideological in comparison to others. Other opposition members from rural or urban areas are of middle or working class backgrounds who were similarly unconnected to the Islamist vision of many of the subsequently formed fighting groups ([Kahf, 2012](#)). Many women's protests have been solely female, as when women supporting the revolution in Salamiya organized protests and then weekly sit-ins, issued statements and acted in solidarity with women prisoners on strike at Adra prison and broke with tradition by participating in funeral processions of those killed by regime forces ([Women's Group of the Coordination of Salamyeh, 2013](#)). Women in Baniyas organized to protest the release of male detainees. And even after the militarization of the conflict, in November of 2012, a markedly post-modern street theater could be seen in the four Bride of Peace march in wedding dresses in Damascus, calling for a ceasefire before their detention ([Reilly, 2012](#)).

Other elements of Syria's opposition operating in exile, including the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan), the National Bloc and other members of the Syrian National Council included women leaders like SNC spokesperson, Basma Kodmani. The SNC reorganized under international pressure to become the Syrian National Coalition of Revolution and Opposition Forces which currently has 8 women out of 114 seats. There are substantial tensions within the SNC and between it and the revolutionaries in

Syria including the estimated 1,200 fighting groups allied with the Free Syrian Army or who are salafi-jihadists. The resented dominance of the Ikhwan in the external opposition, and the role of Qatari or Saudi Arabian funders of the revolution and the salafist groups flying their black banners are a controversial piece of the debate on Syrian women's future status.

Likewise, strong tensions between the supporters of non-violent protest and the militant groups persist, even as many now acknowledge that there is no way forward against Assad without armed struggle. Due to the protracted regime violence, many women supported the idea of U.S. strikes on Syria in response to the murder of Syrian civilians with chemical weapons. Others argued against any intervention either because they consistently opposed militarization of the struggle, or with an anti-imperialist rationale (although Iran, Russia and Hizbullah are deeply involved in bolstering Assad or actually fighting to support his troops). Women are also involved in various training efforts to install civil governance over liberated areas (as well as criticism of the conditions in those areas) and all manner of relief efforts. Coordinating committees throughout Syria include women and despite stereotypes to the contrary, women fight in the conglomerate of groups known as the Free Syrian Army. Women also fight for Assad in the National Defense Force militias set up during 2012-13. They also staff checkpoints, and guard pro-regime neighborhoods. Organized in the all-female Lioness Brigade, they are primarily an Alawi force which would never employ a hijab-wearing Sunni woman and are said to specifically harass such women, calling them "al-Qaeda" ([Sly and Ramadan, 2013](#)).

Other women operate clandestinely in Syria, like Razan Zeitouneh, a human rights lawyer, one of the founders of the Local Coordination Committees which document the conflict and its casualties. Zeitouneh has waged war on the regime with her pen as well, documenting the experiences of the tortured ([Zeitouneh, 2013](#)), arguing that Westerners perturbed by the excesses of the Syrian

jihadists seemed ignorant of the crimes of the regime. She also writes of her experience working underground in Syria "the only outsider (as in Syrian but not from the village), non-veiled, living-in-a-house-alone female in this village who is working among male revolutionaries" ([Razaniyyat, 2013](#)) and who has been threatened by hardline Islamist fighters. Other warriors of the pen like Amal Hanano chronicle Syria's horrible disintegration into death ([Hanano, 2012](#)) and how Syrian public figures avoid "burning their cards" – by hiding their positions on supporting foreign intervention, arming the rebels, backing Jabhat al-Nusra, helping refugees or those inside of Syria ([Hanano, 2013](#)). Mohja Kahf highlighted the revolution's grassroots origins and Syrians' existential awakening into free speech ([Kahf, 2013](#)). Other women reflect on survivor guilt. Those who have gone into exile to pursue careers reflect on their dueling emotions ([Yazbek, 2013](#)).

Other media tropes about women in the Syrian conflict concern their victimization, rape, sexual assault, deaths, torture, dispossession, exile. Girls and young women have lost out on their educations, their career paths, or their ability to marry, now or possibly ever. Marriage is *de rigeur* and costly in Syria where it remains part of a woman's life strategy as compared to the myriad choices for single women in the West. Therefore sexual violence as well as the destruction of daily life dually threaten women's existing or potential life prospects.

It is true that Assad's forces have routinely used sexual violence as a means of warfare against women, to shame and dishonor their male relatives, raping them in front of detainees or prisoners, and sexual violence has also been waged on men ([Wolfe, 2013](#)). An NGO running a women's clinic in Zaatari camp, and another group treating women and children outside the camp explain that women have little choice but to conceal their experiences due to social stigmatization of rape and their fear of further family violence ([Greenwood, 2013](#); R. Zawaideh, personal communication, December 2012). International observers should also realize that rape and sexual violence

by Syrian security forces and prison guards predate the uprising. *Sutra* (the cloak or protection of marriage of raped women) marriage as promoted by Muslim clerics or marriages of refugee girls under 18 to other refugees or Jordanians, and allegedly, Gulf Arabs, may appear tolerable solutions to struggling families but are often merely prostitution in the guise of temporary marriage (Long, 2013). Revolutionary fighters have been accused of raping girls they've kidnapped and married informally and "temporarily." *Urfi* (informal) marriage or short term marriage provides a licit cover for more exploitation of women, or very possibly, an economic strategy for some women.

As everyone seems to know about this exploitation from female matchmakers to U.S. Congressmen, what remedies have been proposed? At a conference on Syrian women held on the sidelines of the Union for the Mediterranean summit on gender issues, rape was discussed as well as women's exclusion from public life promoted by jihadists (AnsaMed, 2013). No clear responses have emerged with no large-scale efforts to help women victims of sexual torture, or violence.

Family violence – by men against women and children, or by women against their children has also been on the rise and is blamed on the stress as a result of the conflict (Benhaida, 2013) although domestic, or family violence was by no means an uncommon feature of Syrian life prior to the revolution.

The ambiguity of gender roles almost always emerges in emergency or wartime circumstances when women shoulder men's responsibilities and both sexes may abandon gendered (sex-role based) expectations. The privatization of warfare as in the revolutionary opposition's structure, or Assad's popular defense committees (as opposed to Assad's professionalized military) means that there are more opportunities for women to fight. In Syria, the Islamist goals and vision of many groups does not always inhibit women fighters, photographers, such as Nour Keize (VanDyke, 2013) medics or women in other support roles. Some have radically changed their lives

-- as Nour says "I used to wear fancy dresses and high heels, but not any more."

However, members of Jabhat Nusra believe women must wear hijab (or be fully covered); they are a "jewel" to be protected by men unlike Western women who have "freedoms" but are manipulated and disrespected (An interview, 2013) Frequent gender segregation in fighting, relief or demonstrating activities in Syria may signify that role reversal is temporary and contested, and that women understand that patriarchy continues to function throughout the conflict.

Despite their marginalization in salafi-jihadist or other Islamist groups and in political leadership, women are part of war fighting. One in every five fighters of the Kurdish YPG is female (Beals, 2013). These fighters stand for the revolution and have battled Jabhat Nusra and the ISIS who consider them heretics. Other fighting groups include the Daughters of Walid Brigade in Homs, a female battalion formed in 2012, whose role was to care for the wounded and refugees (I'an tashkeel, 2012), the Sumayyah Bint Khatab Brigade (Katiba Sumaya Bint Khatab) named after Islam's first female martyr, in Nabak, and Our Mother `A'isha, a female brigade attached to the male al-Tawhid Brigades in Aleppo (Hefez, 2013). These women were formerly co-schoolteachers (Malone, 2013). Our Mother `A'isha's fighters explain their activism as necessary to protect their own children.

The Syrian refugee outflow of more than 2 million heightened pressures on already crowded camps of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (ANERA, 2013) as Palestinians from Syria poured into these camps. Some 40,000 Iraqi refugees in Syria returned to Iraq over a fortnight (Gang, 2013). 120, 000 crowd the inadequate conditions in Zaatar camp in Jordan, while others are at Atme in northern Syria, and are trying to find shelter outside of the camps, or are displaced within Syria. Women attempt to cope with lack of income, food, medicine, medical treatment, education for their children, family violence (Omari, 2013) and uncertainty about the future. Various exploitation schemes are impacting refugees as in other world slums.

NGO Highlight

The Jordanian Women's Union (JWU)

The JWU seeks to foster the status of Jordanian women and their role in the community by empowering them to exercise their full rights based on the principles of equity and equal opportunities. It also aims to remove all legislative, economic, social, cultural and political barriers to particularly of women and children.

To know more about JWU click on the following link:

<http://www.jwu.itgo.com/bg.htm>

The refugee crisis will impact Syria and other countries for the next decade at least.

Feminist historian, McLaughlin indicated that we must examine the interaction of gender and experience and not merely note the divergence (or convergence) of behavior from culturally defined roles (McLaughlin, 1990). Hopefully, more scholars will do so in greater depth. For despite the terrible costs of the Syrian crucible, as with its Palestinian, Algerian and Iraqi predecessors, women's mere survival or participation in war-fighting does not guarantee they will overcome social and political marginalization and insufficient political representation on all bodies likely to lead Syria's future transition.

*Sherifa Zuhur

Director of the Institute of Middle Eastern, Islamic and Strategic Studies.

References on pages 4 & 6

Women and the Crucible of the Syrian Revolution by Sherifa Zuhur

¹ The term “opposition” is used only for the political figures outside of Syria. Bashar al-Assad’s government terms all of these and the revolutionaries inside of Syria, “terrorists. “Conflict” and “uprising” are euphemisms disguising the aim of Syrians to completely overthrow and alter the nature of the regime, hence “revolution.” “Civil war” was adopted by some international organizations in the hopes that terms of the Geneva Conventions would apply to them, but Assad’s military do not recognize that designation or these rights.

References:

- Agence France-Presse. (2013, September 17). Damascus clubbers dance on in bid to forget war outside. *Inquirer News*. <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/489459/damascus-clubbers-dance-on-in-bid-to-forget-war-outside>.
- ANERA. (2013, September 5). Palestinian Refugee Women from Syria. [Video file]. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=71Hn94TmN3I&feature=youtu.be>
- AnsaMed. (2013, September 12). Syria: Women are victims twice over, of combat and ostracism. http://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/sections/politics/2013/09/12/Syria-women-victims-twice-of-combat-ostracism_9287019.html
- An interview with Jabhat al-Nusra. (2013, May 23). *The Economist*. <http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2013/05/syrias-fighters-0>
- Beals, E. (2013, September 10). Syria’s sisters of war. *The Daily Beast*. <http://www.thedailybeast.com/witw/articles/2013/09/10/female-commanders-lead-syria-s-kurdish-rebels-in-fight-against-assad.html>
- Benhaida, S. (2013, February 6). Violence, hardship follow women and children beyond Syria borders. *Arab News*. <http://www.arabnews.com/violence-hardship-follow-women-and-children-beyond-syria-borders>
- Gang, R. (2013, August 30). Syrian refugees in Iraq risking lives to return home amid funding shortfall. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/aug/30/syrian-refugees-iraq>
- Greenwood, P. (2013, July 25). Rape and domestic violence follow Syrian women into refugee camps. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/25/rape-violence-syria-women-refugee-camp>
- Hale, S. (2013, September). Postmodern/postcolonial/feminist ideas and the new insurrectionary movements. *AMEWS E-Bulletin*, 9. <http://iwsaw.lau.edu.lb/publications/images/amews-ebulletin-2013September.pdf>
- Hanano, A. (2012, December, 11). Land of topless minarets and headless little girls. *Foreign Policy*. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/11/the_land_of_topless_minarets_and_headless_little_girls
- Hanano, A. (2013, March 6). Syria’s house of cards. *Foreign Policy*. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/05/syria_s_house_of_cards
- Heffez, A. (2013, July 29). When women joined the jihad in Syria. *Haaretz*. <http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.538525>
- I’lan tashkil katibat banat al-walid fi madinat Homs. (2012, June 19). [Video file]. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O8U_Qe1bAXc
- Kahf, M. (2013). *Then and now: The Syrian revolution to date. A young nonviolent resistance and the ensuing armed struggle* (A special report V.1.1). Minnesota: St. Paul, Friends for a Nonviolent World, St. Paul. http://www.fnvw.org/vertical/Sites/%7B8182BD6D-7C3B-4C35-B7F8-F4FD486C7CBD%7D/uploads/Syria_Special_Report-web.pdf
- Kahf, M. (2012, January 18). Syria’s revolution: Created by local women and men smoking four packs a day. *Fellowship of Reconciliation*. <http://forusa.org/blogs/mohja-kahf/syrias-revolution-created-local-women-men-smoking-four-packs-day/10121>
- Katiba Sumaya Bint Khatab. (n.d.). In Facebook [Group page]. <https://www.facebook.com/KtybtSmyhBntAlkhyat>
- Long, J. (2013, March 28). Rape and sham marriages: The fears of Syria’s women refugees. *Channel 4 News*. <http://www.channel4.com/news/syria-women-rape-marriage-refugee-camp-jordan>
- Malone, C. (2013, September 8). All female group fights in Aleppo [Video file]. *Al-Jazeera English*. <http://blogs.aljazeera.com/topic/syria/video-all-female-rebel-group-fights-aleppo>
- McLaughlin, M. (1990). The woman warrior: Gender, warfare and society in medieval Europe. *Women’s Studies*, 17, 193-209. <http://www.megapathdsl.net/~amichaels/girlsclubdocs/McLaughlin%20The%20Woman%20Warrior.pdf>
- Omari, S. (2013, August 19). As violence soars, a photographic look at Zaatari camp in Jordan. *Women Under Siege*. <http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/blog/entry/as-violence-soars-a-photographic-look-inside-the-zaatari-camp-in-jordan>

Arab Women's Entrepreneurship Program Helps Underserved Arab Women Realize Their Economic Potential



Amina, president of women's cooperative in Morocco, Juhaina, owner of a women's clothing and accessories boutique in Lebanon, and Sataney, producer of home-made jam and sweets maker in Jordan, were all determined to realize their business goals but lacked the necessary skills and tools. After their participation in the Arab Women's Entrepreneurship Program, they are now well on their way to grow their small businesses.

The Arab Women's Entrepreneurship Program (AWEP) is a Citi Foundation-funded initiative, implemented by AMIDEAST in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco. About to start its third year, AWEP aims to empower women entrepreneurs by providing them with the skills and techniques that will enable them to fully realize their economic potential and to allow them to benefit from

networking and mentoring relationships that foster business success. Every year, 20 women are selected to participate in AWEP in each of the four countries.

"Women in the Arab world have lower access to financial and training services than do men. Unfortunately, unemployment remains a significant problem throughout the non-oil producing countries of the Middle East and North Africa, and unemployment rates for women are markedly worse than those for men. Women's economic participation in the region has increased modestly over the past 20 years in many Middle Eastern countries, but it remains under 25% lower than any other world region." (Addressing Barriers to Women's Economic Participation in the ESCWA Region, UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 2012)

"At the same time, rising costs of living are making it even more difficult for low-income households to sustain themselves. While this argues for greater economic participation for women on the one hand, lack of adequate regulations to support and protect women in the workforce and lingering traditional perceptions that make it difficult for many to accept women as breadwinners continue to impact employment prospects for women in the MENA region.

Hence, self-employment continues to be an alternative for many in low-income countries and communities, and programs seeking to further microenterprise development have been created throughout the region. This option can be appropriate for women as it gives them control over the structure of their economic activity, and women business owners and managers tend to hire more women and provide unbiased work environment. Overall, however, women are underrepresented as beneficiaries of enterprise development programs and have lower access to financial and training services than do men. Many of the women who participate are encouraged to pursue traditional and potentially unsustainable activities such as handicrafts." (Active Labour Market Policies in Arab Countries, UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 2012)

AWEP addresses these constraints by providing critical training and support to women entrepreneurs. The training is focused on building entrepreneurship awareness and fundamental business skills, such as: entrepreneurial mindset and personal development skills; formulating a business plan; customer support; sales; use of technology for business growth, and financial literacy.

In addition, AMIDEAST's experience with this program over the past two years has demonstrated that training in best business practices and on the local regulations required for business registration and applications for funding, as well as ongoing support and mentoring, positively impacts the lives of Arab women entrepreneurs such as Amina, Juhaina, and Sataney.

Amina Majdi, president of a Moroccan women's cooperative, wanted to locate the venture's many activities under one roof to attract as many as customers as possible. Through the combination of training and mentorship received via AWEP, she mastered entrepreneurial skills that she was able to share with her staff, thereby strengthening the cooperative's management, adding to its product line, and improving its overall financial health. The cooperative was then able to successfully apply for a government land grant on which to build a bigger center as well as obtain government funding to start construction on the building.

Jouhaina El Awar, a Lebanese entrepreneur, opened a boutique in 2010. She shared everything she learned during the AWEP training with her one employee and implemented most of what she learned, such as planning for expansion, customer service, and sales skills. In spite of the current economic situation and due to the training she received, her sales volume remained stable while it declined for other businesses in the sector. Jouhaina opened a second shop in March, 2013, and she hired one woman. Jouhaina also used the skills she learned to write a business plan for a wedding venue she plans to launch, as soon as funding for this new venture has been received.

Moroccan entrepreneur Sataney Hina, was a by far the shyest participant in Jordan's cohort of women. She has been producing home-made jams for over five years but never thought of expanding her project due to her shyness and lack of confidence. At the start of the training, Sataney barely participated in the group conversations and exercises. The trainers took notice of her personality and gradually worked with her on getting over her shyness. By the end of the training, Sataney had become one of the more confident women. Confident, not only about herself, but also about the quality of her products. She now sells her products to a local supermarket and has recently participated in three different bazaars. She is currently working on developing a proposal to apply for grants that would help her expand her business and help support her and her family.

These women, as well as the other AWEP participants, are now fully equipped with the confidence, knowledge, practical skills, and tools needed to successfully start or grow a small business, and have the ability and opportunity to develop and improve the lifestyle of their communities, families and themselves.

** **AMIDEAST** is a leading American non-profit organization engaged in international education, training and development activities in the Middle East and North Africa.

WHO IS SHE? Profiling: Nadia Al-Ghazzi




Nadia al-Ghazzi (born in 1935) is a Syrian lawyer, woman of letters and cultural encyclopedist. Some of her fifteen publications include stories related to social issues (*Qadaya khasa jiddan*, 1991), research on women in the modern and ancient civilizations of Syria and Mesopotamia (*Hakaya silsaliyya li-nisa' mayyitat*, 1996) and encyclopedias on the culture of food in the Sham land (*Hadarat al-ta'am fi bilad al-rafidayn wa-bilad al-sham*, 5 vols., 2001). Her philosophical and symbolic novel, *Hathayan hirr musab bil-ikti'ab* [The Hallucination of a Cat Afflicted with a Depression], 2005 is unique in modern Arabic literature.

Al-Ghazzi was the first woman to produce and present a family program in the Arab Syrian Television (1960-1961). She has collaborated with the committees of the Syrian Women's Union for the amendment of family Laws in Syria. She wrote in the Arab women journal (*Majallat al-mar'a al-arabiya*) on social and criminal reality, with more emphasis on their human values than their criminal acts. Since 1986, she continues to contribute to the journal *Tabibak* (*Your Doctor*), on the alternative medicine inspired by the ancient cultural customs and practices (*al-turath al-sha'bi al-tibbi*).

Nadia al-Ghazzi has lectured on topics such as social norms and gender issues related to divorce, marriage disputes, and femininity and unmarried women. She contributed in raising Syrian women's awareness of their social and legal rights.

Dr. Hosn Abboud
hosnabboud@gmail.com

Highlights



Women, Gender, and the Palace Households in Ottoman Tunisia

Author: Amy Aisen Kallander

Publisher: University of Texas Press

Year of Publication: 2013

In this first in-depth study of the ruling family of Tunisia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Kallander investigates the palace as a site of familial and political significance. Through extensive archival research, she elucidates the domestic economy of the palace as well as the changing relationship between the ruling family of Tunis and the government, thus revealing how the private space of the palace mirrored the public political space.

“Instead of viewing the period as merely a precursor to colonial occupation and the nation-state as emphasized in precolonial or nationalist histories, this narrative moves away from images of stagnation and dependency to insist upon dynamism,” Kallander explains. She delves deep into palace dynamics, comparing them to those of monarchies outside of the Ottoman Empire to find persuasive evidence of a global modernity. She demonstrates how upper-class Muslim women were active political players, exerting their power through displays of wealth such as consumerism and philanthropy. Ultimately, she creates a rich view of the Husaynid dynastic culture that will surprise many, and stimulate debate and further research among scholars of Ottoman Tunisia.

Women and the Crucible of the Syrian Revolution by Sherifa Zuhur

References:

- Reilly, J. (2012, November 28). Where are the missing brides of peace? Women activists who protested about violence in Syria – and were dragged off to jail in their wedding dresses. *Mail Online* <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2239746/Damascus-Women-activists-held-protest-violence-souk-dragged-jail-wedding-dresses.html>

- Sly, L. & Ramadan, A. (2013, January 25). The all female militias of Syria. *The Washington Post*. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/01/25/the-all-female-militias-of-syria/>

- VanDyke, M. (2013, September, 12). Not anymore: A story of revolution [Video file]. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RA8HsfRioWE>

- Wolfe, L. (2013, April 3). Syria has a massive rape crisis. *The Atlantic*. <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/syria-has-a-massive-rape-crisis/274583/>

- Women's Group of the Coordination of Salamyeh. (2013, September 7). The woman in the Syrian revolution, viewed by revolutionary women." <http://syriafreedomforever.wordpress.com/2013/09/07/the-woman-in-the-syrian-revolution-viewed-by-revolutionary-women/>
<http://syriafreedomforever.wordpress.com/2013/09/07/la-femme-dans-la-revolution-syrienne-vue-par-des-femmes-revolutionnaires/>

- Yazbek, S. (2013, September 13). The novelist vs. the Revolutionary: My own Syrian debate. *The Washington Post – Opinions*. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-novelist-vs-the-revolutionary-my-own-syrian-debate/2013/09/13/188fad04-1b51-11e3-a628-7e6dde8f889d_story.html

- Zawaideh, R. (2012, December). Personal communication in connection with her organization's medical missions to Zaatari and elsewhere in Jordan.

- Zeitouneh, R. (2013, September 16). Cheating death in Syria: The five Syrians who fled from AbulMawt. *NowMedia*. <https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/cheating-death>

- Zeitouneh, R. (2013, August 6). Back. *Razaniyyat*. <http://razanghazzawi.org/>

To contribute announcements or articles to this newsletter or to subscribe, please email: amewsbulletin@gmail.com

AMEWS E-bulletin is published in cooperation with the Women and Memory Forum and the Institute for Women's Studies in the Arab World at the Lebanese American University.

